Banana Navy
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Lab · Threat modeling IA · Fiche détaillée

Call channel saturation

the attacker saturates the call entry (robocalls, call flooding, SIM farms, voice DDoS) to make the service unavailable or drown its protection mechanisms.

SheetF10
CategoryD-TB7-01 (denial of service)
Layers1 · Call Entry
Systemvoicebot IA

number reputation filtering, rate limiting, per-source and per-duration quotas, sized capacity, clean degradation under hostile load.

The threat

the attacker saturates the call entry (robocalls, call flooding, SIM farms, voice DDoS) to make the service unavailable or drown its protection mechanisms.

Angle mortWhy classic frameworks miss it

classic application DoS targets infrastructure; here the voice channel is the saturable resource, and each call costs more than a web request.

MitigationProposed approach

number reputation filtering, rate limiting, per-source and per-duration quotas, sized capacity, clean degradation under hostile load.

The proposed control
capacity and quotas that bound the call entry.

Expected evidence
the service holds under hostile load (saturation test) or degrades cleanly.

SourcesReferences and public research

MITRE ATLAS 2026.07AML.T0029 Denial of AI Service
Recherche publiquePublic research sources: MITRE ATLAS 2026.07 (verified technique mapping), OWASP GenAI (catégories par abus de modèle), and the public risk-voicebot (aivansoul/risk-voicebot) template defining the 20 checkpoints. No client registry data: generic sheet, no rating, no verdict.
couche 1 · Call Entry

Explore the 20 security layers

MITRE ATLAS 2026.07 · OWASP GenAI · risk-voicebot